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The Meanings of “Malignancy”: The Language of Enmity and the Construction of the 
Parliamentarian Cause in the English Revolution 
In 1643, the opening year of the English civil war, the royalist general in the north William 
Cavendish, duke of Newcastle, published a response to allegations made by his 
parliamentarian rival Ferdinando Lord Fairfax. Amongst other things, Newcastle had been 
accused of raising an army of “Papists and Malignants,” a charge that provoked a revealing 
answer: 
But let us inquire who in their Dialect, are these Malignants; Are they who do not willingly part with 
their Religion, Laws, Liberties, Lively hoods left them by their Fathers upon Arbitrary Votes? So a 
Theefe may terme a True-man a Malignant, because he doth refuse to deliver his Purse upon demand; 
.... Those have hitherto been esteemed Malignant humours in the Body Naturall, which being 
stubborn, Rebellious, Venomous, are with difficulty, reduced to their right temper, either by strength 
of Nature, or skill in Physick, not those which are not easily infected, or distempered. This is new 
Learning, and requires a new Dictionary to warrant it. Before they conclude them Malignant, they 
should do well to prove them to be Peccant against any authentick rule: The Apostle saith, where 
there is no Law there is no transgression; To accuse boldly is not sufficient to convince.
i
  
 
That the English civil war inspired literary innovation alongside intellectual creativity 
is well acknowledged.
ii
 Newcastle’s quotation suggests that the conflict’s protean force was 
capable of refashioning the English language itself.
iii
 For him, the parliamentarian cause had 
spawned a perverse “dialect,” requiring a novel “dictionary” to decipher it. And the word that 
prompted this act of deconstruction was not chosen accidentally, for the figure of the 
“malignant” had assumed a central place in the ideological contests of the civil war. From 
denoting a rebellious internal spirit in need of purgation, by 1643 this word had become 
associated with the enemies of parliament. For Newcastle, this was an act of linguistic 
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gymnastics symptomatic of the distortions underpinning parliamentarianism itself. The 
divisions that had rent England could be encapsulated by a single word. 
“Malignant” can hardly be said to be a novel term to civil war historians: on the 
contrary, it is so familiar as to be rendered almost invisible, implicitly treated as a 
straightforward synonym for “royalist.” But this article will suggest that the word malignant, 
and its attendant forms, had a rather more specific place within parliamentarian discourse. 
Identified first in the Grand Remonstrance of November 1641, the “malignant party” was 
represented as an invasive presence in the body politic, guilty of conspiring to divide king 
from parliament. Wholeness would only be restored once this enemy had been expelled, a 
task that had fallen on parliament. But as well as justifying the parliamentarian war effort as 
an act of loyalty to the crown, the image of the malignant party was used to help identify the 
nature of the parliamentarian cause itself, its ultimate goals defined against those of this 
enemy.      
In making this argument, the article follows a current of scholarship on modern 
revolutions in which the image of the enemy is seen as central to revolutionary discourse.
iv
 
The work of François Furet in particular identified the idea of conspiracy as central to the 
political culture of the French Revolution: the plot facing the revolutionaries was “a central 
and polymorphous notion that served as a reference point for organizing and interpreting 
action.”v But for Furet, the perceived existence of enemies not only served to explain the 
Revolution’s Manichean logic. The aristocratic nature of the conspiracy also defined the 
Revolution itself, as the first experiment in democratic politics which found its obverse in the 
conspiratorial factionalism of the court, now to be replaced by a transparent and egalitarian 
public politics.
vi
 The “purifying act” of defeating the enemy thus became central to the 
foundation of a new order rooted in “the people”: “only its formal exclusion from society 
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could lend legitimacy to the new national pact.”vii Furthermore, this discourse of exclusion 
was also one of integration, for the act of defining the enemy also served to bring cohesion to 
“the people” as a collective, defined in opposition to the aristocracy.  
Leaving aside Furet’s assertions about the novelty of French revolutionary politics, 
this article will focus on the importance of the enemy in the English Revolution. In particular, 
it will concentrate on the dual capacity for exclusion and integration that Furet posited as 
central to the concept of conspiracy in French revolutionary discourse. Of course, the image 
of the enemy is integral to a much wider variety of political contexts than the revolutionary.
viii
 
But as the enemy is an infinitely contestable concept, its identification has the power to 
dismantle as well as create an imagined collective, to delegitimize as well as endorse the 
government that purports to act in the collective’s name. Perhaps this is why the concept of 
the enemy has been so ubiquitous in revolutionary contexts, as it can be both a powerful 
solvent for one existing political order and the cement that holds the succeeding regime 
together. Indeed, to Susan Buck-Morss (writing about the foundations of liberal democracy 
and socialism in the twentieth century), “To define the enemy is, simultaneously, to define 
the collective. Indeed: defining the enemy is the act that brings the collective into being.”ix 
In the case of the English Revolution, the conspiracy of the malignant party played a 
crucial role in both legitimizing and defining the parliamentarian cause, as well as the 
“people” in whose name it fought the civil war. By unveiling the existence of a conspiracy 
headed by the malignant party, the Long Parliament (or rather a leading faction within it) 
asserted its status both as the principal intended victim of this conspiracy and the ultimate 
bulwark against it, so justifying the constitutional claims it was making in the months prior to 
the outbreak of war. Discursively, the image of this enemy was a strategic part of what Kevin 
Sharpe called the “contest for representation” that accompanied the armed conflict.x 
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Parliament’s eventual success rested not only on its ability to deploy its authority successfully 
in order to mobilize and manage military resources, but also to represent its exercise of 
authority as legitimate, a challenge given that the traditional arsenal of images, languages, 
and rituals that represented authority were heavily weighted towards the regal. However, in 
the post-Reformation period royal authority was predicated on the monarch’s ability to 
uphold the true religion and to defend it against popery. This meant that the crown had to 
continually demonstrate its vigilance against an enemy whose identity was the collective 
property of the Protestant nation and thus to a large extent beyond its discursive control. The 
familiar conspiracy theory of the popish plot was thus open to appropriation by the designers 
of the Grand Remonstrance, who fashioned it into a new narrative centered on a malignant 
party bent on the destruction of the Long Parliament and the reformist program upon which it 
had embarked. Opposition to this program could thus be stigmatized as illegitimate and 
unworthy of political representation, so preserving parliament’s claims to be the 
representative of the people, a people now defined against the malignant party. 
This article traces the emergence and usage of the language of malignancy by 
focusing on several key parliamentarian texts of the 1640s, beginning with the Grand 
Remonstrance. Unveiling the conspiracy of the malignant party was an assertion of the power 
of parliament to identify and act against the kingdom’s enemies, and so the reality of the 
malignant party became bound up in subsequent contests about the locus of sovereignty in the 
polity. Pamphleteers who referenced the malignant in their own publications were implicitly 
intervening in such contests. However, as with the crown before it, the Long Parliament was 
never able to secure full control over the definition of its enemies: the exigencies of 
parliamentarian politics led it to relinquish some of this power to activists who claimed to 
speak for the people. The diagnoses of malignancy that such activists presented in their own 
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pamphlets and other political interventions could depart from that of parliament, contributing 
to the fragmentation of its cause.  
The article considers how the various splits in the parliamentarian coalition were 
mirrored by rival conceptions of the enemy. The radicalization of parliamentarian politics 
during the war itself was justified by the existence of the malignant party, as the ideological 
challenge of malignancy demanded a fuller statement of the principles for which parliament 
was fighting for, and stronger assertions of parliamentary- and later popular- sovereignty. 
Contests within this coalition after the war were related to the question of whether 
malignancy had been truly defeated: whereas Presbyterians argued that a new enemy, heresy, 
now posed the greatest threat to the kingdom, their Independent rivals fell back on the specter 
of the malignant enemy to assert their own claims to be parliament’s truest friends. But 
alternative political narratives presented by the Levellers and the New Model Army in their 
own remonstrances identified the evil of “kingly government” as the true enemy to be 
expunged, so preparing the ground for the regicide. Even then, however, the malignant 
continued to haunt the post-regicidal regimes. The article concludes by considering the 
ambiguous afterlife of the term following the regicide and its place in a longer term 
transformation of political culture that saw the eventual institutionalization of partisanship in 
the form of party politics.  
- 
Conspiracies, and the enemies who engineer them, were far from the invention of the French 
Revolution.
xi
 Indeed, the binary way of thinking that sustains such narratives has been seen as 
a particular feature of early modern culture, exemplified by the arch-deviant the witch.
xii
 For 
English Protestantism, the defining other was provided by the Catholic Church, and perhaps 
here we find the antonym of the parliamentary cause, in this last “war of religion” fought in 
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defense of reformation.
xiii
 Historians have shown how before the civil war anti-popery 
acquired a life of its own, as the crown struggled to maintain discursive control over the 
identity of its enemies, with popery being used to describe a range of behavior that went far 
beyond straightforward observance of Catholic forms of worship. Peter Lake has stressed 
how anti-popery was intimately connected to early Stuart political divisions. Anti-popery 
(and its obverse, anti-Puritanism) served to explain conflict whilst maintaining the integrity 
of a political system that was supposed to deliver harmony, each side accounting for division 
“by labelling the other as intrusive and un-English subverters of a settled system of 
government.”xiv Stereotypes such as puritan and papist helped to make sense of the world, but 
were always contestable, part of a “struggle to seize control over the terms in and through 
which the contemporary sociopolitical scene could be turned into a narrative, with heroes and 
villains, a beginning, middle and an end, and thus into an object of polemical and political 
action.”xv Stereotypes were not merely the detritus of an underlying “real” political struggle, 
but were amongst the “discursive materials” through which power was exercised and 
contested.  
 Within this pre-civil war discursive contest, malignancy was often an attribute 
associated with the Catholic Church: “The malignant Church, the Romain Sinagogue, the 
Kingdome of Anti-christ.”xvi But the label was also occasionally used by supporters of 
Charles I and Archbishop Laud to describe their “malignant and cunning adversaries,” those 
“malignant refractory spirits” who disturbed the peace of church and state, part of the 
Laudian narrative of a “Puritan plot.”xvii What made malignancy a potent negative attribute 
was its connotations of illegitimate, spiteful, and baseless opposition to authority; or, as 
Newcastle put it, of being “Peccant against any authentick rule.” Dictionary definitions of 
“Malignitie” included “Envie, spightfullnesse,” “naughtiness, malice,” and “A delight taken 
in another mans harme.”xviii In natural bodies, malignant humors, spirits, or influences were 
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harmful precisely because they opposed bodily order: enemies within, to be treated by 
purgation or excision. The language of malignancy was thus the product of a culture that 
idealized unity and harmony and struggled to accommodate dissent from these ideals.
xix
  
 With its connotations of illegitimate opposition, malignant was a label that could be 
used by anyone speaking in the name of authority in order to silence or delegitimize 
opposition. By the 1640s, however, the language of malignancy was the near exclusive 
property of parliamentarians, and royalists were left to fall back on traditional categories such 
as “rebel” to classify their enemies, although in equally binary terms.xx The parliamentarian 
appropriation of this language can be pinned down with unusual precision to a specific 
enunciation of its cause: the complaint known to history as the Grand Remonstrance, which 
was passed by a narrow majority in the Commons on 22 November 1641.
xxi
 Here, parliament 
definitively asserted its authority to identify and act against the enemy, a power on which 
many of its subsequent constitutional claims rested. However, it is important to note that this 
was the culmination of a longer term political contest over the definition of the enemy and the 
state of emergency that its existence entailed.
 
In some respects, such matters were at the crux 
of what historians have labeled the Elizabethan “monarchical republic,” as members of the 
political nation came together in crisis moments in order to defend church and state against 
popish threats.
xxii
 But it was under the Stuarts and especially Charles I that this contest 
became a regular feature of political life, prompted in part by the willingness of the crown’s 
defenders to argue that threats to the kingdom might require customary restraints on royal 
power to be bypassed.
xxiii
 Whilst there was widespread consensus that the king was duty-
bound to preserve church and state and that this fell under his prerogative power, parties 
disagreed as to whether this should be the king alone or the king-in-parliament, with 
parliament as the king’s counsel helping to identify the kingdom’s dangers.xxiv The definition 
of danger was itself a major bone of contention: opponents of royal policies such as Ship 
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Money might argue that the state of emergency was not sufficient to justify overriding law, 
but more dangerous was the tendency to identify alternative threats to which the king was 
blind. So the Protestation of the House of Commons in 1629 presumed to define those who 
“shall be reputed a capital enemy to this Kingdom and Commonwealth”: innovators in 
religion, architects of non-parliamentary subsidies, and those willing to pay them.
xxv
  
It is notable that as late as 1637 one critic of the crown, the lawyer Oliver St John, 
conceded that “It is his [the king’s] vigilance and watchfulness that discovers who are our 
friends and foes, and that after such discovery first warns us of them, for he only hath power 
to make war and peace” (in his famous speech on Ship Money).xxvi In practice this vigilance 
was delegated to local communities through an elaborate system for identifying and 
nullifying the kingdom’s internal enemies, above all papists. This system obliged people of 
all walks of life to carefully monitor their communities, so constituting a “public” capable of 
acting autonomously of its supposed royal head.
xxvii
 Such political vigilance was bound up in 
what Richard Cust has termed an early Stuart “patriot” political narrative, whereby the 
idealized patriot was compelled to act in defense of the kingdom (or “country”) against 
corruption, with parliament as his stage.
 xxviii
  
It was a short step from this narrative to the idea that parliament, acting in the public’s 
name, possessed the powers that St John had reserved for the king, particularly once 
parliament itself appeared to be the target of such conspiracies. The so-called “army plot” of 
April 1641 prompted another Commons Protestation about “pernicious and wicked counsels, 
practices, plots and conspiracies,” going beyond its 1629 predecessor by inviting 
subscriptions from beyond parliament.
xxix
 As Lake has argued, conspiracies by their very 
nature are secretive, and so their defeat might require that they be unveiled to those under 
threat, bringing into being a public characterized by its “vigilance and watchfulness.”xxx  
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Parliament’s assertiveness throughout 1641 was justified by this perceived state of 
emergency, notably during the king’s absence in Scotland throughout the summer when its 
first ordinances were issued.
xxxi
 Already it had acted against the most prominent public 
enemy, the Earl of Strafford, and throughout 1641 the program of the “Junto” dominant in 
parliament centered on identifying the king’s friends too as they sought to control the 
selection of his advisors. At the same time the Junto’s tactics were facing a rising current of 
criticism, both within parliament and without, which threatened to derail its program of 
constitutional and religious reform.
xxxii
 The imminent return of Charles to Westminster in the 
autumn threatened to bring this situation to a head. This was the context for the Grand 
Remonstrance: an attempt to persuade waverers to unite behind the Junto’s agenda, whilst 
delegitimizing any opposition to it as malignant.  
The Grand Remonstrance reconfigured the patriot narrative to incorporate the 
achievements of the Long Parliament and its historic predecessors, along with the opposition 
that they had provoked since the beginning of Charles I’s reign, thus encouraging a 
historicizing trend in political discourse over the subsequent decade.
xxxiii
 For its drafters, it 
was important to demonstrate that they were the ones attracting, rather than creating, 
opposition; the language of malignancy, of illegitimate opposition, thus served their 
intentions well. The Remonstrance’s opening complained of “an abounding Malignity, and 
opposition in those parties, and factions” who sought to hinder parliament’s progress.xxxiv 
These enemies comprised those guilty of dividing the body politic in order to serve their 
“malignant, and pernicious designe, of subverting the Fundamentall Laws, and Principles of 
Government; upon which the Religion, and Justice of this Kingdom, are firmly 
establisht.”xxxv But the truly novel usage of the word was the identification of a “malignant 
party” behind this conspiracy, headed by Strafford and Laud but not extinguished by their 
downfalls.
xxxvi
 The malignant party thus collectivized the familiar trope of the “evil 
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counselor,” implying that behind these figureheads lay a much more deeply rooted 
conspiracy. 
In many respects, this malignant conspiracy appears indistinguishable from the 
familiar trope of the “popish plot.” The petition accompanying the remonstrance explained 
that “we have reason to believe that those malignant parties, whose proceedings evidently 
appear to be mainly for the advantage and increase of Popery, is composed, set up, and acted 
by the subtile practice of the Jesuits and other engineers and factors for Rome.”xxxvii 
Unquestionably, the ultimate aim of this conspiracy was to advance the malignant church. 
But the Grand Remonstrance distinguished between the popish and malignant parties, with 
the latter described as a composite of three distinct factions: “Jesuited Papists,” Bishops and 
other corrupt clergymen, and courtiers in the pay of foreign powers.
xxxviii
 The ultimately 
popish character of this “mixt party” was a product of the first part overpowering the other 
two, being the “most active” and “predominant Element.”xxxix But parliament was not simply 
summoning the tried and tested scapegoat of the papist in order to tap into the deepest, 
unchanging prejudices of English Protestants.
xl
 By identifying a new manifestation of the 
popish plot, the Grand Remonstrance presented this conspiracy as fundamentally bound up 
with the fate of the Long Parliament and its historic mission to bring “The multiplied evils 
and corruption of sixteen yeers” to “judgement and Reformation.”xli The chief design of the 
malignant party was to prevent these efforts- detailed exhaustively in the Remonstrance- from 
coming to fruition, using every effort to poison the king against parliament and foment 
division within the latter.
xlii
 The ultimate ends of this party might have been to destroy the 
true religion, then, but its defining feature was opposition to parliament, or rather, to the 
faction within it who sought to have their agenda endorsed as parliament’s own. Any 
opposition to this agenda could now be identified as malignant, and therefore illegitimate. 
The Grand Remonstrance thus acted as a discursive accompaniment to the more prosaic 
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techniques of parliamentary management that were allowing parliament to be steered in an 
increasingly partisan direction.
xliii
  
The Remonstrance’s stated aim was to restore unity within the body politic by 
appealing to the king to exercise his powers “in a parliamentary way.” This would enable the 
reestablishment of an idealized state of harmony and balance between crown and parliament, 
as “the comfort of your gracious presence, and likewise the unity and justice of your royal 
authority” would “give more life and power to the dutiful and loyal counsels and endeavours 
of your Parliament.” xliv As such, it referenced the virtues of concord that the English political 
system was supposed to sustain. However, as Richard Strier has noted, “It is a profoundly 
dualistic, almost Manichean document,” at odds with the idealized harmony it purports to 
uphold.
xlv
 In fact, the Remonstrance implies that unity can only be restored once the existence 
of the enemy has been acknowledged, something dependent on reconciliation between a 
parliament purged of its own internal enemies and the crown: the Remonstrance is a plea for 
Charles to turn his back on the malignant party that surrounds him. This party is unmasked as 
the enemy within, whose members are thus positioned outside of the kingdom’s moral 
community and are made unworthy of representation in parliament, justifying the expulsion 
of bishops and popish lords and their allies who stood in the way of the Junto’s designs. The 
designers of the Grand Remonstrance needed a language to explain why parliament’s actions 
were provoking opposition, internal and external, which did not undermine parliament’s 
status as representative of a united people. They found this in the language of malignancy, 
which allowed them to exorcise their enemies whilst retaining, indeed conferring, wholeness 
on parliament: integration through exclusion.
xlvi
  
- 
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Thus, the Grand Remonstrance appropriated the popish plot- a widely accepted, indeed near 
incontrovertible, trope in English Protestant culture- in order to stigmatize the enemies of 
parliament (or rather, of a faction within it) as contributors to this conspiracy. The malignant 
party was an imagined enemy not in the sense that there was no substance to the charges 
against it, for parliament did indeed face enemies, but rather because this was an enemy 
constructed within the terms of parliamentarian discourse and embedded within a narrative 
that was intended to serve specific political ends. The success of this narrative is attested to 
by the rapidity with which the term “malignant party” spread beyond parliament, entering, for 
instance, into the county petitions that flooded into parliament in the early months of 1642.
xlvii
 
Its popularity may in part be attributed to the fateful decision to allow the 
Remonstrance to be published. Sir Edward Dering famously expressed unease “that we 
should remonstrate downward,” and subsequent events reveal that he was right to be 
concerned, as the term malignant party exploded into widespread usage.
xlviii
 The printed 
Remonstrance helped to rally crowds of protesters against the presence of bishops and popish 
lords in parliament during the tumultuous “December Days,” leading to their de facto 
exclusion.
xlix
 At the end of the month, Thomas Smith wrote to Sir John Pennington regarding 
“such jealousies & discontents are daily raised by the Malignant Party betweene the King & 
People, that wee talke nowe of nothing but drawing of Swords, & a war betweene the 
Protestants & Papists, which God forbid: for tho wee may knowe the beginning, no man can 
the end & Consequences of an intestine war.”l Once Charles left London, Smith reported that 
“Many of the Popish & malignant Party (as they call them) begin nowe to leave the Houses & 
retire to their Houses in the Country out of a pannicque feare of the multitude.”li By the logic 
of the Grand Remonstrance, those members who left their seats to flock to the departed king 
had revealed themselves as malignant enemies of parliament, and were thus no longer worthy 
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of representation within it; they had purged themselves, and parliament remained whole 
without them.
lii
 
The language of malignancy was also popularized due to parliament’s frequent 
recourse to it as the political crisis escalated, such that the epistemic status of the malignant 
party became an aspect of the crisis itself. In this sense, the civil war was a product not just of 
rival ideologies, but rival epistemic communities, predicated on belief or unbelief in the 
existence of a malignant party. Indeed the narrative of the Grand Remonstrance had a self-
confirming quality: the more that parliament’s actions provoked opposition, the more real the 
existence of the malignant party became. And as we shall see, the format of the remonstrance, 
often modeled explicitly on this precedent, would become a major form of political 
communication alongside the more celebrated petitions of the period. Not for nothing was 
parliament’s self-justificatory collection of official sources entitled An Exact Collection of 
Remonstrances, with the Grand Remonstrance taking pride of place as the opening statement 
of parliament’s position.liii 
The flexible nature of the category of malignancy meant that it could be attached to a 
range of positions that could be delegitimized as “anti-parliamentarian.” For instance, 
parliament cited the existence of the malignant party during the militia dispute that prefigured 
the outbreak of war, and thus opposition to the militia ordinance became a defining feature of 
malignancy.
liv
 Following Sir John Hotham’s refusal to admit the king into Hull, the 
Commons called on the king to join it in “suppressing this wicked and malignant Party, who, 
by false Colours and Pretensions of maintaining Your Majesty's Prerogative against the 
Parliament … have been the Causes of all our Distempers and Dangers”; support for the 
prerogative now became a mark of the malignant.
lv
 The Commons also began labelling 
certain individuals as part of this party, both inside and outside of the house, amongst them 
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the Duke of Richmond, whose call for an adjournment of parliament was labeled as “a 
Motion of dangerous Consequence.”lvi The charge of malignancy was seen by some as 
undermining parliament’s traditional “freedom of speech,” leading one member, Thomas 
Savile, earl of Sussex, to complain that “in a free Parliament, why it was not lawful for me to 
vote freely according to my conscience without being made of the malignant party, I could 
not imagine.”lvii  
On 19 May, parliament voted to publish a sequel to the Grand Remonstrance. The 
royal response to this was telling.
lviii
 Parliament’s refusal, “after eight Moneths amusing the 
Kingdome with the expectation of a discovery of a Malignant Party,” to “name any, nor 
describe them,” was but a stratagem designed to rob the king of his independence, notably his 
freedom to choose his friends and enemies.
lix
 Rather than being tempted away from 
parliament by some spectral malignant party, the reality was that the “true Malignant Party” 
had “driven” rather than “drawn Vs hither.”lx In the absence of the king and so many of its 
members, parliament’s claim to represent the kingdom was specious: “If, as in the usage of 
the word Parliament, they have left Vs out of their thoughts; so by the word Kingdome, they 
intend to exclude all Our people, who are out of their walls: (for that’s grown another Phrase 
of the Time, the Vote of the major part of both Houses, and sometimes of one, is now called, 
The Resolution of the whole Kingdome).”lxi  
By labelling his parliamentarian enemies as “the true Malignant party,” the king 
tapped into widespread fears that parliament was in the thrall of a faction, and thus no longer 
able to represent the people. Despite this intervention, malignancy continued to be largely 
associated with royalism, and thereafter the usual royalist response was simply to deny its 
meaningfulness. In November 1642, the king complained that “to be a Traytor (which is 
defined, and every man understands) should be no crime, and to be called Malignant, (which 
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no body knows the meaning of) should be ground enough for close imprisonment.”lxii This, of 
course, was precisely the argument deployed by Newcastle in the quote that opened this 
article, as he posed as defender of the English language and the traditions it embodied against 
the perverse new “Dialect” of the parliamentarians.lxiii Thus, the parliamentarians were under 
the influence of “malignant Humours,” which produced in them a rebellious spirit requiring 
reduction.
lxiv
 The threat of ill humors lurked within the body natural, demanding constant 
discipline, and the appropriate response to discord in the body politic was a restoration of 
normal political, and increasingly social, relations. In the royalist reading, popular 
involvement in politics (“tumults”) invariably breeds ferment and discord, and the enemy- 
unbridled passions, embodied in the madness of the crowd- always remains within.
lxv
  
By contrast, in its construction of the malignant party, parliament imagines an enemy 
that might be defeated absolutely. There is something eschatological in this imagined 
confrontation and the ensuing state of harmony, which acquires a utopian flavor present even 
in the Grand Remonstrance, with its seemingly trivial suggestion that one consequence of 
victory would be the improvement of England’s herring fishery.lxvi The point here is that the 
malignant party is the sole obstacle to a more profound revival of the kingdom: a true 
“reformation of the state.”lxvii Before this party can be defeated, however, it must first be 
identified, and as the royalists recognized, parliament had only loosely hinted at its precise 
identity, a signifier without a stable signified. This perhaps explains the popularization of the 
term: defining the enemy became a collective effort whereby parliament sketched out 
characteristics, and its supporters filled in the details. This was a participatory activity, 
through which individuals and groups could identify themselves as the friends of parliament 
and thereby influence the parliamentarian cause, which became ever more unstable in the 
process.  
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In part this was an activity conducted in print, a technology used as a means of 
political participation in its own right.
lxviii
 On 23 August, parliament voted to have printed A 
New Remonstrance, which distinguished between an “Arminian party” who had kept the 
church in bondage and a malignant party responsible for oppressing the commonwealth, 
comprising “Court-parasites, and fawning flatterers,” papists, bishops and “Prelaticall 
Clergie,” judges, and monopolists.lxix By implication, its defeat would lead to a new, 
Protestant politics devoted to the public good. But numerous other pamphlets, with titles such 
as A Plea for the Parliament, or, Considerations for the satisfaction of such, who are apt to be 
mis-led by a Malignant Party against the Parliament (London, 1642), performed a similar task 
with no such official status. The Lively Character of the Malignant Partie described “a 
company of malevolent, or ill-affected persons to the peace of this Church and State,” which 
“doth daily multiply, and is now become such an Epidemicall disease, that like a Leprosie, it 
hath over-spread the whole Body of this Nation.” Here, the party included papists, prelates, 
“great Personages” who enjoyed a life of “prodigalitie, riot, excesse, and horse-races” and 
thus feared reformation, delinquents (a stock name for miscreants named by parliament), evil 
counselors, and finally violent cavaliers, “the Hot-spurtes of the Times.”lxx What is more 
striking than this by now conventional typology is the rancor with which the malignants are 
described: “(like the Devill himselfe) they may be termed Legion.”lxxi In fact, as the 
parliamentary coalition began to fissure under the strain of war, breeding an active “peace 
movement” in parliament and on the streets of London, the malignant enemy was demonized 
ever more vituperatively.
lxxii
 Diagnoses of malignancy were thus interventions in an internal 
contest to define the cause of parliament and the reasons why it had gone to war, as well as 
how far it was prepared to go in that conflict.
lxxiii
 Indeed, the specter of the malignant was 
used strategically by those who through posing as parliament’s truest friends, the “well-
affected,” sought to goad it into ever more radical directions.lxxiv  
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A desire to sharpen the contours of conflict also informed the Solemn League and 
Covenant of 1643, which was intended to unify the Protestant nation in much the same way 
that the Grand Remonstrance aimed to unite parliament: by identifying its true enemies, and 
acting as a shibboleth to expose those who were unwilling to join the battle against it.
lxxv
 The 
ongoing search for “incendiaries, malignants, or evil instruments” was enshrined in its fourth 
clause.
lxxvi
 In fact, Hezekiah Woodward argued that the Covenant’s integrational power 
would be enough to unite the three kingdoms into one, something predicated on a purge of 
“the accursed, Persons and Things.”lxxvii The lukewarm could not be trusted.lxxviii The Un-
deceiver went so far as to suggest reviving the law of Solon whereby “all that would not 
apply themselves to one side or other, should be put to death, because they would not 
adventure their private persons for the publique good; for men not to declare themselves at 
such a time, was not accounted Moderation, but Treachery.”lxxix The pamphlet opened with 
the brutal assertion, supported by scripture, “all Neuters are in a state of Enmity.”  
Confronting the enemy in the battlefield was easier, however, than dealing with the 
malignancy that seemed to lurk within those who were ostensibly loyal to parliament whilst 
secretly praying for an end to war. How should parliament respond to this threat? One clue is 
given by a decision taken by the Commons on 18 October 1643, “That the Committee for 
plundered Ministers shall have Power to enquire after malignant Schoolmasters,” who 
thereafter joined ministers and professors as groups who were specifically to be investigated 
for signs of malignancy.
lxxx
 The attention given to schoolmasters is suggestive of the 
widening scope of malignancy, as it became increasingly treated as ideological deviancy. The 
schoolmaster had a powerful hold over the young: to Woodward, “he distelleth, infuseth, 
droppeth into children what pleaseth them, and that is ever what is worst, whereunto corrupt 
nature stands most bent and biased.”lxxxi The effort to educate people out of their malignant 
errors went beyond the schoolroom; this was a mission taken up by a multitude of authors 
19 
 
who fought the war with “pens and heads,” laboring to create “a knowing people, a Nation of 
Prophets,” as Milton put it.lxxxii There are parallels here with Protestant efforts to re-educate 
the population following the Reformation, and one pamphlet mimicked the characteristic 
form of Protestant pedagogy, the catechism, by presenting itself as a dialogue in which the 
reservations of a royalist were answered by a “loyalist.” The result would be A Medicine for 
Malignancy: Or, Parliament Pill, serving to purge out the Malignant humours of men dis-
affected to the Republick (London, 1644). Thanks to the enemy, many thousands had been 
“slain in their senses by their Syren devises, having given so much eare to their charmes, that 
they have plunged themselves into a perpetuall abysse of infamy and slavery both in point of 
Law and Conscience.”lxxxiii  
A Medicine for Malignancy relied on the Grand Remonstrance to justify parliament’s 
stance, whilst reflecting the subsequent entrenchment of its narrative: harmony would return 
once the king had been brought to recognize this reality.
lxxxiv
 But an underlying eschatology 
belied any pacific sentiment, suggesting that peace could only follow from a fight to the 
death.
lxxxv
 This battle left no room for “foolish pity,” and following parliament’s victory 
“Tiburne and the Scaffold at Tower-hill will have more worke then they have had many a 
yeere.”lxxxvi 
Unsurprisingly, our “royalist” was ultimately won over. But perhaps such medicine 
was intended to strengthen the resolve of wavering parliamentarians rather than to cure 
recalcitrant royalists. Certainly, another published “pill” for that “Frenzie, now raigning 
amongst divers English Protestants, which will not see the danger that their Religion and 
Liberties now lie in” advertised itself as for the benefit of both “the weakest of the well-
affected” and “the archest Malignant.”lxxxvii Similarly, for Woodward the Covenant should 
not just be the occasion for purging malignants from the moral community. It should also 
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engender an inner purification: “The first worke in well Posturing a mans selfe, is, The 
subduing Malignant selfe.”lxxxviii For him, the reformation of the three kingdoms ultimately 
relied on the reformation of the self.   
- 
Such sentiments suggest alternative fates for the malignant party, should parliament be 
victorious. Malignant tendencies might be ultimately wiped out by a drive to educate the 
English people about the justice of the parliamentary cause, or a more exemplary justice 
might be inflicted upon the enemy: A Medicine for Malignancy hints at what might amount 
to a parliamentary Terror. However, when war ended, another contest emerging from within 
the parliamentary coalition came to the fore. Newcastle had prophesized that “If a common 
Adversary did not keep them in a Kind of Herodian Unity for a Time, your Brownists would 
soon condemn your ordinary Disciplinarians for Malignants, and your Anabaptists again your 
Brownists,” and by 1646 this was proving prescient, although it was the contest between 
Presbyterians and Independents that took this form.
lxxxix
 
One Presbyterian who adopted this approach was John Bastwick, who had already 
attacked “malignants” against the Gospel in 1643. xc Three years later he discerned another 
dimension to their conspiracy: “there is a direct harmonie betweene the Independents and 
Cavaliers of all sorts, whether malignant, or popish Cavaliers.”xci The “unlawfull Liberty” (of 
conscience) demanded by Independents would ultimately achieve the designs of the 
malignant party, “for then Cavaliers, Papists, Prelates, Malignants, Turkes, Iewes and 
Heathens, would all pretend, that they beleeve, serve, and worship God, according to the 
Light they have received.”xcii This meant that those of the malignant party were prepared to 
“looke upon the Independents, and speak of them usefull as their friends.” To another author, 
this alliance was “Herod and Pilate reconciled.”xciii 
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But in other statements of the Presbyterian cause, malignancy was overshadowed by a 
more alarming sickness in the body politic, the “gangrene” of heresy diagnosed by Thomas 
Edwards.
xciv
 Edwards’s fears were echoed in one controversial effort to mobilize Presbyterian 
support in London, another remonstrance, but one which departed significantly from the 
Grand Remonstrance. Directed to the House of Lords by London’s Corporation in May 1646, 
this text told a familiar story of high hopes vested in parliament being thwarted, but here the 
blame did not lie with the malignants. Rather, it lay with the “private and separate 
Congregations daily erected in divers parts of the City” who were preventing reconciliation 
between crown and parliament.
xcv
 In order to highlight this new danger, the threat of the old 
enemy was downplayed, allowing the City Remonstrance to argue for fiscal-military 
demobilization, an appealing stance for war weary Londoners “now that the Enemy hath but 
few Holds left.”xcvi  
The Independent response focused on restating the terms of the Grand Remonstrance. 
One riposte purported to “pray God the Malignant has not too great a finger in this Worke,” 
alleging “that a great part of the maine Sticklers in the Remonstrance, are such as were 
alwayes backward to the Parliament.”xcvii Indeed, one defender of the City Remonstrance 
conceded that “it is very probable that Malignants as well as other men are well pleased, that 
we are true to our Covenant in that Article which concernes our Loyalty to his Majestie.” His 
response, that “If this be an offence, truly I cannot consent to remove it, although scrupled at 
by so many pretended tender consciences,” only accentuates how the narrative of the 
malignant plot was no longer serving the political needs of peace-seeking Presbyterians.
xcviii
   
The opposite was the case for the Independents, who strove to prove their loyalty to 
parliament by emphasizing their status as the most zealous enemies of the malignant party.
xcix
 
The Presbyterian position could be contested in other ways, however. Another response was a 
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rival remonstrance, this time addressed to the Commons, which claimed to speak for “many 
thousand citizens.”c Like the City Remonstrance, this text was departed from the narrative 
contained in the Grand Remonstrance, although it did commend that “First Remonstrance” 
for having revealed “to all the World” those “Policies and Court Arts” that had kept the 
English people in bondage.
ci
 But the Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens went on to 
break with the Grand Remonstrance’s reading of history, a narrative it sought to transcend, if 
not contradict.  
This was not because the Grand Remonstrance was wrong in identifying a conspiracy 
at work; rather, it had misidentified its nature. According to this new narrative, the chief 
conspirators in the plot to subjugate the English people were their post-Norman Conquest 
monarchs. Charles I was deeply implicated in this plot, a truth that the Grand Remonstrance 
had inadvertently confirmed.
cii
 However, parliament’s blindness to its own conclusions had 
caused it to invent a different conspiracy of which the king was victim, thus masking his own 
culpability: “you maintaine, The King can doe no wrong, and apply all his Oppressions to 
Evill Counsellors, begging and intreating him in such submissive language, to returne to his 
Kingly Office and Parliament.”  
Partly it was parliament’s blindness to the true enemy that had been responsible for 
the failure to deliver England from its bondage. But parliament had also been misled from 
within by those Lords and their dependents who had led the people to war in a fit of pique, 
“male-contents” who had been “vexed that the King had advanced others, and not themselves 
to the manageing of State-affaires.”ciii Thus they had stirred up the people’s righteous anger 
about arbitrary government, leading them into war for their own private interests. Ultimately 
this Junto simply desired to replace one set of evil counselors with another. In order to make 
sure that “the Supreame Power fall not into the Peoples hands, or House of Commons,” the 
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corrupt Lords had plotted to exhaust the people in a prolonged war before making a peace 
that failed to “disturbe the King in his Prerogatives, nor his Lords and Prelates in their 
Priviledges.”civ Indeed, this remonstrance hints that had the people recognized their bondage 
from the beginning, war would have been unnecessary: they could simply have reclaimed 
their rightful power from the king with an irresistible force. The true conspiracy of the last 
five years, “the mystery of iniquity,” was that this had not been allowed to happen. 
Whereas the Independents typically claimed their stake in the parliamentary cause by 
posing as parliament’s truest friends, here the Commons was informed bluntly that “Wee are 
your Principalls, and you our Agents,” and that “The Worke yee must note is ours, and not 
your owne.”cv Rather than allude to the “well-affected,” the common term used to identify 
parliamentarian activists, this text addressed itself to “all well-minded People,” whose chief 
role is to hold parliament to account.
cvi
 Ever since the Protestation, if not before, 
parliamentarian discourse had evoked a political “public” marked by its vigilance against 
conspiracy. In this remonstrance, parliament itself is made the chief target of popular 
scrutiny: the representatives of the people needed to be kept in check by the “radicality of its 
gaze.”cvii  
In structural terms, the Citizens’s Remonstrance evokes the Grand Remonstrance, 
which had presented the king as in thrall to a malignant party guilty of estranging him from 
parliament; once the king had recognized this, harmony would be restored. Substitute “the 
people” for parliament, and “parliament” (or more specifically, “the House of Commons”) for 
the king, and we essentially have the structure of the Citizens’s Remonstrance, which sought 
to restore unity between these two parties, demanding that the Commons “Forsake, and 
utterly renounce all craftie and subtill intentions, hide not your thoughts from Us, and give us 
encouragement to be open breasted unto you.”cviii The role of the malignant enemy could 
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either be taken by the king himself, or perhaps more accurately by the corruptions of kingly 
government. The Remonstrance thus demanded that parliament “declare and set forth King 
Charles his wickednesse openly before the world, and withal ... shew the intollerable 
inconveniences of having a Kingly Government, from the constant evill practises of those of 
this Nation; and so to declare King Charles an enemy.”cix Just as the Grand Remonstrance 
had implicitly demanded that Charles renounce powers that he felt were essential to his 
kingship, so the Citizens’s Remonstrance suggests that parliament would have to reconstitute 
itself in order to be freed from the corruptions of kingly government, and fulfill its claims to 
represent the people: abolishing the House of Lords, dissolving itself, and holding new 
elections.  
Both remonstrances, then, ostensibly sought to heal divisions whilst making demands 
that were likely to widen them. The similarities go further than that, however. In the Grand 
Remonstrance, the unveiling of the malignant party was not just a device to bring king and 
parliament back together and thus to reunite the kingdom; it also served to confer a 
wholeness on a parliament that was ever more divided. By branding its opponents malignants 
who were inherently unworthy of representation, parliament could continue to claim to 
represent the people as a whole. Where the Grand Remonstrance introduces the opposition of 
parliament versus malignant party, the Citizens’s Remonstrance opposes “the People” to 
“kingly government.” The implication is that those who seek to perpetuate “kingly 
government” cannot be of “the People” themselves.cx The unity of “the People” is thus 
confirmed: the Citizens’s Remonstrance talks of them in the singular throughout.cxi 
Read in this way, The Remonstrance of many thousands of citizens reworks the 
parliamentary cause in a fundamental way, supporting those who would see its probable 
authors, Richard Overton and William Walwyn, and the political movement that they helped 
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found, as radical innovators. But by abandoning the language of malignancy, the Levellers 
opened themselves up to accusations of belonging to that party themselves, or at least 
inadvertently doing its work.
cxii
 Such continued recourses to this language suggest that, 
despite the attempts of Levellers (and indeed Presbyterians) to transcend it, the narrative of 
the Grand Remonstrance still overshadowed parliamentarian politics.  
But were the Levellers mistaken in assuming that “the People” could be trusted to 
reject the evils of “Kingly government”? Another remonstrance that emerged during the post-
war period suggests that one party whose journey had for a while followed a similar course to 
the Levellers, the officer corps of the New Model Army, had drawn this conclusion.
cxiii
 The 
Army Remonstrance, usually attributed to John Ireton and addressed to the House of 
Commons on 20 November 1648 before publication, was presented as an exit from 
parliament’s post-war impasse. It claimed to identify “where the main danger seems to lie, 
and where any way to escape.”cxiv Like The Remonstrance of many thousands of citizens, the 
Army Remonstrance reveals considerable disenchantment with the recent actions of 
parliament, although unlike that text it does refer to the malignant.  
In a superficial sense, the Army Remonstrance mirrors the structure of the Leveller 
Remonstrance, only substituting the army for “the People” as the grieved party seeking 
reconciliation with the House of Commons (again, the Lords is ignored). Certainly such a 
reunion was stated as the desired outcome, but the argument is subtler than that. Instead, the 
Army Remonstrance claims to uphold “the Publike Interest of a Nation,” which is opposed to 
“tyranny and injustice in Kings or others.”cxv This bears some resemblance to the Leveller 
binary of “the People”/ “Kingly government,” but is subtly different, as the former are 
represented by the “Publike Interest” that the army claims to uphold. In fact, the way that the 
Army Remonstrance talks about “the People” is very different to the Leveller Remonstrance: 
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they are divided, unsettled, and apt to be misled, a “troubled people” willing “to follow any 
party, pretending to end their troubles, and ease their burthens.”cxvi Public safety was the 
highest rule in politics- “salus populi suprema Lex”- but the people seem unable to discern 
their own interests.
cxvii
 Thus the historical part of the Army Remonstrance presents the people 
as having been drawn into a self-destructive conspiracy, from which only the army could 
save them. 
This part of the narrative covers the period from the passage of the vote of no address 
of 11 February 1648, which is presented as occurring at a time when “settlement” was on the 
cusp, to its repeal on 24 August and the reopening of negotiations with the king. To the army, 
this had broken the unity of the parliamentary coalition, allowing its “enemies to conceive 
fresh hopes and confidences” that in the rush to peace they would preserve “tyranny and 
injustice.”cxviii Thus under the banner of a “personal treaty” with the king they had worked to 
“raise new disturbances, and therein to ingage a numerous and mixt party,” fashioned from 
“the deluded multitude and rabble about the City, with the old Malignants, new Apostates, 
and late discontented party, both in the City and Parliament it self.”cxix Just as in the Grand 
Remonstrance, the interests of the papists overpowered the other parts of the malignant party, 
so in this new party the malignants would ensure that “the Interest of the King and his party 
were so incorporated throughout.”cxx And the unity of this party was fashioned against its 
own “common Enemy,” the army itself. Recognizing that it had been cast in the role of the 
malignant presence needing purgation before harmony could be restored, the army here 
attempts to prevent this by offering an alternative diagnosis of the kingdom’s ills. The 
operation, of course, would begin with Pride’s Purge, the most famous political purge in 
English history, intended to free parliament from any taint of malignancy. It continued by 
reconstituting parliament into a body that might genuinely reflect the “the Publike Interest of 
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a Nation,” although further surgery would be required. In between, the arch-malignant had 
met his end. But would the malignant party die with the king? 
- 
The malignant was thus present in some form at most of the major turning points in 
parliamentarian politics throughout the 1640s. Even its absence, for instance from the 
Leveller Remonstrance, is telling, in this case marking a conscious break from the narrative 
that had dominated parliamentarian politics since the Grand Remonstrance. It is possible, of 
course, to see the emergence of labels such as this one as an inevitable by-product of political 
polarization; this name-calling, surely, mattered much less than the “real” conflict of the civil 
war. However, as the above article has hoped to show, labelling and stereotyping were 
intrinsic to the process of polarization, enabling contemporaries to identify the parameters of 
conflict and locate themselves within them. Categories like malignant were linguistic 
resources to be drawn on in order to impose some order on a bewildering political landscape, 
allowing contemporaries to distinguish between friends and enemies and act accordingly; 
even reluctant participants in the conflict were forced to choose their side or face the 
consequences. Labels were made meaningful by being fashioned into narratives that rendered 
complex events legible, allowing them to act as discursive poles around which people were 
mobilized and organized into the more durable collectives that were essential to fight the 
war.
cxxi
 This contest was fought out discursively, as parties attempted to destabilize their 
rivals’ categories: the history of the malignant party cannot be written apart from royalist 
attempts to deconstruct it.  
Some labels and narratives were official in the sense that they emerged from texts 
issued by bodies claiming to speak with authority- authority that could then be contested by 
denying the veracity and meaningfulness of such utterances. However those who embraced 
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official discourses were not necessarily the passive recipients of propaganda; doing so was a 
means of political participation in its own right.
cxxii
 The rise of the language of malignancy 
shows how the parliamentarian cause emerged through a series of statements disseminated by 
parliament in order to justify its position and mobilize support, but these texts were subject to 
interpretation and revision by readers: a dialogue between the “people” and their 
representatives. Here, the focus has been on the Grand Remonstrance, which contributed a 
new character to the repository of stereotypes available to stigmatize opponents. This was a 
character clearly located within parliament’s discursive framework, as opposed to “papist” 
which was the collective, albeit contested, property of the Protestant nation. That 
contemporaries recognized its partisan associations is clear from contemporary usages of the 
term malignant, which proliferated in parliamentarian pamphlets from 1642 onwards. Much 
of the appeal of the malignant party was that it allowed parliamentarians to frame their stance 
as loyalist, fighting in defense of the king. However, as the war went on, the image of the 
malignant was a particularly useful tool for those seeking to derail attempts to blur the 
boundary between friends and enemies in the name of peace, a strategy also deployed by 
Independents against Presbyterians. Subsequent attempts to recast parliamentarian politics by 
the Levellers and New Model Army dispensed with a malignant party playing the strategic 
role of misleading the king, who was now himself identified as the enemy. But the fact they 
continued to reference the Grand Remonstrance, mirroring its structure in order to express 
their own alternative political narratives, surely marks this as one of the “master texts” of the 
English Revolution.  
 If the malignant party was a ubiquitous ingredient of parliamentarian politics up to the 
regicide, its place thereafter is much more problematic. With the execution of the king, we 
might expect to see the disappearance of the malignant party from parliamentarian discourse. 
However, just as the regicide failed to erase the presence of the king from the political 
29 
 
imaginations of so many English people, so the presence of the malignant lingered under the 
Commonwealth and Protectorate, regimes that sometimes appear to have been obsessed with 
their enemies. London’s watermen, the printing press, and even the army itself were all 
feared at points to be infected with malignancy, not to mention numerous individuals such as 
one Richard Ford, “a most desperate Malignant” returned from exile and requiring “a speciall 
Eye upon him.”cxxiii Cromwell’s chief intelligencer John Thurloe was kept informed of the 
activities of malignant exiles by his correspondents overseas.
cxxiv
 Diagnoses of malignancy 
could also come from closer to home, as when the Council of State noted the shutting of 
shops in London and Westminster on Christmas Day, “upon the old grounds of superstition 
and malignancy.”cxxv 
For a regime still facing enemies, the obdurate survival of malignancy helped to make 
sense of the failure of military victory to deliver harmony. Local activists were able to take 
advantage of this situation in order to legitimize their continued political engagement. We 
might expect that this combination of an embattled regime and an enthusiastic cohort of 
activists willing to act in its defense would give rise to a kind of police state, reliant on a 
combination of denunciations and surveillance. Indeed, such an impression may be given by 
the Council of State’s reaction to reports from the town of Hereford in May 1649 that few 
were “well affected to the present government.” In response, it instructed its local agent “to 
have a watchfull Eye upon them, to keepe that Towne & Castle from being surpriszd or kept 
by any malignant party.”cxxvi Five years later, “divers Godly and well affected persons” from 
the town remonstrated to the Protector concerning those who maintained “high hopes of 
introducing theire old superstitions, and of advancing the malignant interest,” suggesting that 
the regime was indeed reliant on local agents willing to denounce their neighbors as enemies 
within.
cxxvii
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However, to caricature the post-regicidal regimes as somehow proto-totalitarian on 
the evidence of such episodes would be misleading, for the context in which these statements 
were made reveals that the Commonwealth and Protectorate had a more equivocal attitude 
towards their former enemies. The remonstrance of the well-effected of Hereford was made 
during elections for the first Protectorate parliament, which had involved participation from 
those they recognized as “Papists, malignants and men actually in armes for the late king.” 
Their fear was that “men of contrary principles will be advanced to high power; who are 
either manifestly malignants prelaticall or at the most neuters in the cause of Christ, and may 
prove to be averse to this present Goverment, and the interest of the Godly and well affected 
of this nation, and to the power of godlyness it selfe.” The well-affected of Hereford appear 
here as an embattled minority, clinging on to old polarities as a means to retain their 
increasingly tenuous influence. 
Although the Instrument of Government had barred “persons, who have aided, 
advised, assisted, or abetted in any war against the Parliament” from voting or standing for 
parliament, the concerns of these Hereford activists were not groundless, for all the post-
regicide regimes exhibited a desire for “accommodation” that might allow former enemies to 
reconcile with the regime.
cxxviii
 The Army Remonstrance reflected this duality, calling for 
“exemplary Justice” to be “done in Capitall punishments upon the principall Author and 
some prime instruments of our late warres, and thereby the blood thereof expiated,” before 
suggesting that mercy might be extended to “the rest of the Delinquents (English).” cxxix The 
latter sentiment informed the Act of General Pardon and Oblivion of February 1652, which 
was predicated on a desire that “all Rancour and Evil Will occasioned by the late Differences 
may be buried in perpetual Oblivion.”cxxx One of Thurloe’s correspondents writing from 
Bristol in 1655 felt that the lack of “any plott from the old malignant principle, or 
fermentinge any ugly humour tendinge to the publique mischefe” was thanks to this measure: 
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“For the truth is, our malignants, and newters, and all sorts are now soe setled againe in their 
trade since the act of Oblivion, and by reason of peace and quiet the cittie increaseth in trade, 
that soe they may get money (which is most soveraigne to them) and be in quiet, they will be 
far from any new plots.”cxxxi 
One provision of this Act was that pardon would only be granted to those who had 
taken the oath of loyalty to the Commonwealth, the Engagement. Although its preamble 
argued that “the better uniting of this Nation” could only come from an alliance against “all 
Invasions from abroad, as the Common Enemy at home,” in practice this was presented as an 
avowal of outward conformity rather than inward conviction, much like the Elizabethan Oath 
of Supremacy before it.
cxxxii
 But would this external obedience be enough for those 
committed parliamentarians who had hoped to purge all traces of malignancy? Just as the 
Elizabethan settlement ultimately provoked anxiety from the “hotter sort” of Protestants 
about the continued Catholic beliefs and habits of many who conformed to the Church of 
England, so the Commonwealth’s loose definitions of loyalty were likely to disturb those of 
the well-affected who feared that malignancy was being allowed to linger in the hearts and 
minds of their countrymen.
cxxxiii
 In these circumstances, the charge of malignancy could 
actually be counterproductive for regimes needing to enlarge their dangerously narrow 
support bases, caught between the priorities of peace making and the instinct to perpetuate 
the state of emergency that had been a constant companion to parliamentarian politics 
throughout the 1640s.  
Furthermore, as the term came to be used against so many who had sided with 
parliament in the civil war, it became harder to associate malignancy with the conspiracy 
originally identified in the Grand Remonstrance. If “by a Malignant, is meant one that 
opposeth the Parliament,” who exactly fell into this category after Pride’s Purge, let alone the 
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dissolution of the Long Parliament?
cxxxiv
 Already in 1648 Clement Walker could argue that 
“the definition of a Malignant is turned the wrong side outward.”cxxxv Subsequent events 
would only serve to detach the term further from the political landscape in which it originally 
found meaning. Arguably, this made it an increasingly easy target for royalists, for whom the 
malignant party was a clear example of “the artifice of the conspiratours in Parliament to 
devise names, which the people vnderstood not, and suggest terrours to them from things, 
that had not entred into their thoughts.”cxxxvi The Restoration gave free reign to such charges, 
and so, when on the occasion of his own parliament’s Act of Oblivion Charles II expressed 
his hope that “the old reproaches of Cavalier, and Round-head, and Malignant be commited 
to the Grave,” many former parliamentarians must have breathed a sigh of relief.cxxxvii It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that the term malignant seems to have largely disappeared from 
political discourse thereafter, too closely associated with the civil war and regicide to be 
useful for Whigs during the Exclusion Crisis or in the aftermath of the Glorious 
Revolution.
cxxxviii
 
But if this suggests a successful royal restoration of language, the other half of the 
coupling “malignant party” had of course become a ubiquitous part of political life, which 
increasingly came to be understood as the clash of organized collectives possessed of “rival 
truth-claims.”cxxxix The king’s hope that public life would henceforth be conducted free from 
name-calling was to be frustrated; conspiracy theories and the partisan stereotyping of 
enemies continued to abound in the “age of party.”cxl However, the eventual 
institutionalization of political hostility in the form of adversarial party politics provided a 
solution to the problem of how to accommodate antithetical enemies within a single moral 
community. Slowly, the idea that parliament might legitimately be the site of organized 
partisan struggles won acceptance, part of a “move away from the expectations of uniformity, 
that had been current in the early Stuart period and that the Restoration regime attempted to 
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resurrect, towards a situation in which diversity of opinions was seldom embraced but had 
come to be expected and even accepted.”cxli The “impulse to exclude” persisted on both sides, 
but in the long term all attempts to purify the body politic failed; now enemies would have to 
learn to live alongside each other.
cxlii
 
Looking back in 1655 at the tumultuous events that had led to Charles I’s departure 
from London fourteen years previously, the church historian Thomas Fuller recalled that 
“About this time the word Malignant was first born (as to the Common use) in England; the 
deduction thereof being disputable, whether from malus ignis bad fire; or, malum lignum, bad 
fewell; but this is sure, betwixt both, the name made a combustion all over England.”cxliii As a 
parliamentarian turned royalist who was now seeking to tread as non-partisan a path as 
possible, Fuller explained that his own usage of the term would be for convenience rather 
than to express any ideological position, “because one had as good be dumb, as not speak 
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sparked when parliament unveiled the conspiracy of the malignant party left a political 
landscape transformed, something which no amount of Restoration forgetting could conceal. 
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